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Abstract This paper aims to make explicit the methodological conditions that
should be satisfied for the Bayesian model to be used as a normative model of
human probability judgment. After noticing the lack of a clear definition of
Bayesianism in the psychological literature and the lack of justification for using
it, a classic definition of subjective Bayesianism is recalled, based on the
following three criteria: An epistemic criterion, a static coherence criterion and a
dynamic coherence criterion. Then it is shown that the adoption of this framework
has two kinds of implications. The first one regards the methodology of the
experimental study of probability judgment. The Bayesian framework creates
pragmatic constraints on the methodology that are linked to the interpretation of,
and the belief in, the information presented, or referred to, by an experimenter in
order for it to be the basis of a probability judgment by individual participants. It
is shown that these constraints have not been satisfied in the past, and the question
of whether they can be satisfied in principle is raised and answered negatively.
The second kind of implications consists of two limitations in the scope of the
Bayesian model. They regard (i) the background of revision (the Bayesian model
considers only revising situations but not updating situations), and (ii) the
notorious case of the null priors. In both cases Lewis’ rule is an appropriate
alternative to Bayes’ rule, but its use faces the same operational difficulties.
Keywords  Probability judgment • Subjective Bayesianism • Bayesian coherence
• Probability revising • Probability updating • Linguistic pragmatics
21.  Introduction
In the imposing literature devoted to the psychological study of probability
judgment, the use of a theoretical model as a referential norm for “rational”
behavior is a usual methodology.1 Since the pioneering study by Rouanet (1961),
and following the famous article by Edwards et al. (1963), the Bayesian model of
probability has been the most frequently used as a normative reference or as a
possible descriptive model. The implicit question that these studies attempt to
answer is whether human beings perform probability judgment in a “Bayesian”
manner. These interrogations go far beyond the realm of psychology: They also
apply to the various domains that use the Bayesian model, such as economics
(Davis and Holt 1993), law (Callen 1982), medicine (Casscells et al. 1978),
artificial intelligence (Cohen 1985) and philosophy (Stich 1990).
The present paper is not directly aimed towards these important debates
concerning probabilistic functioning in humans, but is rather a methodological
examination of the conditions under which the Bayesian model may be used as a
normative theory. In other words, it aims to find an answer to the following
question: Does the psychological literature take into consideration the various
implications and constraints imposed by the usage of the Bayesian model as a
normative reference? It will be argued that the answer is negative, and the
obstacles which the experimental methodology should overcome if the model
were to be used will be reviewed. This paper will be organized as follows. In the
next Section, the descriptive and normative uses of the Bayesian model made in
the past will be reminded, and the main criticisms against using the Bayesian
model reviewed. Then, the status of Bayesian model in the psychological
literature and in probability theory will be examined in turn (Sections 3 and 4);
these preliminary considerations are necessary to arrive at a definition of
Bayesianism: Such a definition is clearly a prerequisite in order to answer the
main question that the paper addresses. The answer to this question will be
presented in Section 5, in which the requirements of the Bayesian model, specially
pragmatic, will be spelled out, and the misunderstandings of Bayesian model in
experimental studies exposed. Finally, in Section 6, several questions related to
the scope of Bayesian model will be considered and some of its limitations will be
pointed out.
                                                
1 One can think of four major exceptions: Cohen’s (1960) pioneering work on “psychological
probability”; Hammond’s theory of social judgment (Hammond 1955); Anderson’s theory of the
integration of information (Anderson 1991) and research on “fast and frugal heuristics”
(Gigerenzer et al. 1999). More generally, and from a descriptive point of view, it has often been
claimed that normative models in general, and the Bayesian model in particular, require unrealistic
computational faculties, and are therefore poorly adapted to the realistic description of human
judgment (Chase et al. 1998, Oaksford and Chater 1992). Bayes’ identity (see Appendix 1), in
particular, demands the combination (multiplication, addition and subtraction) of at least three
different numerical items.
32.  Descriptive and normative uses of the Bayesian model
in experimental studies of probability judgment
The review of studies of probability judgment (whose references will be detailed
in this and the next Section) points to the general conclusion that human beings do
not seem to perform probability judgment in a “Bayesian” manner. Experimenters
can have two interpretations of this negative result, depending on whether they are
concerned with the coherence of human probability judgment or with the
descriptive adequacy of the model.
First, the Bayesian model is maintained as a model of reference, and the
experimenter makes use of it to appraise the coherence of human probability
judgment. In line with this view, many studies argue that human judgments are
not Bayesian because participants’ predictions deviate significantly from the
results of the experimenters’ calculations based on the theory of probability and
Bayes’ rule (see Appendix 1) (for a review see Piatelli-Palmerini 1994; and for a
recent discussion of the arguments see Baratgin 2002a). Since, in this
interpretation, the normative character of the model is not questioned, many
authors have naturally been led to investigate the means to remedy participants’
performance.
This first interpretation was reflected in the 1960’s in that part of the
literature in which humans were considered to be “conservative”. That is to say,
human performance was not found to coincide with the results obtained by
applying “Bayes’ rule”, which the experimenter posited as the norm of revision.
Thus, participants’ answers turned out to be less optimal than the answer
calculated by the experimenter using Bayes’ rule (for reviews, see Edwards 1968,
and Slovic and Lichtenstein 1971).
A decade later, the well known “heuristics and bias school” used Bayesian
model to underline the deviations from the predictions made by this model. These
deviations were considered to result from heuristics put to use by participants. For
example, some studies underlined participants’ strong tendency to neglect base
rates (that is, the numerical reference describing the distribution of a characteristic
in a population) which, in experiments, were identified with participants’ prior
degrees of belief (for a survey see Koehler 1996).
Studies of this type, as well as the various controversies that they have
stirred up (for example: Anderson 1991, Christensen-Szalanski 1984, Edwards
1983, Gigerenzer 1996, Hogarth 1981, Lopes 1991, Phillips 1970, Smedslund
1990), have helped reveal a number of phenomena linked to probability judgment,
such as the neglect of pertinent information, and the means of reducing this
neglect (for instance, by acting on the context of the task, or by presenting
probabilities in a frequentist format). They have also provided many theoretical
propositions about the use of heuristics and the concept of “bias” (Koehler 1996)
or about the importance of the frequentist format (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 1995).
The second interpretation of the status of the Bayesian model as a
reference in experimental studies consists in considering its descriptive quality.
From this point of view, it is not the coherence of the judgment that is questioned,
but the model itself. According to many researchers, the discrepancies found
4between participants’ responses and the prescriptive data calculated with Bayes’
rule should not be considered as biases, but rather as a proof of the descriptive
inadequacy of the normative model (Edwards 1983, Einhorn and Hogarth 1981,
Hogarth 1981, Jungermann 1983, Lopes 1991). This has incited a number of
investigators to give up Bayes’ rule. One minimal step away consists of building
alternative algebraic rules and comparing them with Bayes’ identity (Anderson
and Sunder 1995, Duh and Sunder 1986, Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 1995, Leon and
Anderson 1974, Lopes 1985, McKenzie 1994a, Shanteau 1970, Troutman and
Shanteau 1977). Going one step further, a few investigators have designed new
descriptive models such as the gap model (Smith et al. 1993) and Tversky’s
support theory (Tversky and Koehler 1994).
Whatever the point of view adopted, there have been many criticisms of
the use of the Bayesian model as a normative reference. They stem from the
problem of the justification of the model (Moldoveanu and Langer 2002): Given
that (i) within standard probability theory there are other rules of revision; (ii) still
within standard probability theory there is another possible interpretation of
probability, namely the frequentist interpretation; and (iii) beyond standard
probability theory there are a number of alternative ways to model degrees of
belief, why use Bayesian theory?
(i) Other revision rules than Bayes’ rule may be considered within standard
probability theory (Rosenkrantz 1992, Walliser and Zwirn 2002). Two of them are
of special interest. One, the Dodson-Jeffrey rule (Dodson 1961, Jeffrey 1965; see
Appendix 2) has already been experimentally studied and appears to present
rather good descriptive qualities (Funaro 1975, Gettys 1973, Gettys, Kelly and
Peterson 1973, Gettys, Michel, Steiger, Kelly and Peterson 1973, Snapper and
Fryback 1971). The other is Lewis’ rule (Gärdenfors 1988, Lewis 1976; see
Appendix 3). To our knowledge, there is no empirical psychological study of
probability revision that considers Lewis’ rule (but see below).
(ii) According to some researchers, other models can explain the experimental
results. For example, De Zeeuw and Wagenaar (1974) explained the phenomenon
of conservatism based on a Newman-Pearson decision maker behavior and
Birbaum (1983) showed that signal theory can predict answers analogous to those
given by participants who neglect base rates. In many publications, Gigerenzer
suggests using the frequentist theory of probabilities as a reference, as in his view,
probability judgment improves when the experimental paradigm is presented with
natural frequencies (as compared with single-event probabilities) (for a review,
see Hoffrage et al. 2002).
(iii) In addition, there are a number of other possible ways to model degrees of
belief, beyond the classic field of probability theory. This is the case for different
models of uncertainty, which are particular in that they do not respect the axiom
of additivity of probabilities,   
€ 
If H∩G =∅,  then P(H∪G) = P(H) + P(G) and its
corollary, the complementarity constraint,   
€ 
P(H) + P(¬H) = 1. The following list of
examples is non-exhaustive: “Probations” of Bernoulli (1713); Baconian
probability of Cohen (1977); possibility theory of Dubois and Prade (1988a);
evidentiary value theory of Gärdenfors, Hansson and Sahlin (1983); evidential
5probability system of Kyburg (1961); potential surprise theory of Shackle (1949);
Demspster-Shafer belief function theory of Shafer (1976), lower and upper
probability theory of Walley (1991) and non-axiomatic reasoning system of Wang
(1994). These theories use different revision rules than Bayes’ rule (for a survey
of several forms of revision, with a practical illustrative example, see Smets
1991). On the one hand, these theories supply possible explanations for
participants’ responses in different experimental paradigms that are used (Cohen
1977, 1979, 1981 and 1982, Fisk and Pidgeon 1998, Freeling and Sahlin 1983,
Gärdenfors 1983, Kyburg 1981 and 1983, Levi 1985, Wang 1996). These theories
can also be used as norms of reference in experimental studies, as suggested by
some authors (Dubois and Prade 1988b, Shafer and Tversky 1985) and as
illustrated by a number of studies (Curley and Golden 1994, Da Silva Neves and
Raufaste 2001, Raufaste and Da Silva Neves 1998, Raufaste et al. 2003, Robinson
and Hastie 1985, van Wallendael 1989, van Wallendael and Hastie 1990, Sahlin
1983).
In the light of the foregoing points, one may wonder why it is almost exclusively
the Bayesian model that has been used as a normative reference for the
experimental study of probability judgment. To answer this question, we need to
analyze the status of the Bayesian model in the psychological literature, that is, to
identify (i) what justifications are given for its use, and (ii) what definition of it is
offered.
3.  Status of Bayesianism in the experimental literature
3.1. A problem of justification
First of all, there is a striking lack of justification for the use of “Bayesianism” in
the experimental literature that takes it as a theoretical model of reference. This is
all the more surprising as, generally, mathematical tools in and of themselves are
rarely the objects of studies in psychology. Nevertheless, one can find a few
explanations, either historical or conceptual, for the use of the Bayesian model in
psychology.
Historically, its use came in the wake of experiments on models of
decision theory. As early as the 1950’s, the link had already been established
between economic decision theory and psychology (Edwards 1954). First, the
studies related to the expected utility theory of von Neumann and Morgenstein
(1944) reflected psychologists’ interest in considering models worked out by
economists in order to describe and assess agents’ behavior. Second, probabilistic
judgment had already been taken into consideration in the large number of studies
carried out on subjective expected utility theory (for a survey, see von Winterfeldt
and Edwards 1986).
Conceptually, the use of the Bayesian model is mainly a result of the
attraction of certain theorists of probability towards psychology, as shown by
different exchanges between specialists of probabilityand psychologists in the
6Journal de Psychologie Normale et Pathologique (Cohen and Hansel 1957,
de Finetti 1955, Fréchet 1954 and 1955; see also: Cohen 1960, de Finetti 1957,
1963, 1990, 1974a and 1974b, Fréchet 1951, Savage 1954). The incorporation of
the Bayesian model into the experimental study of human judgment was defended
by theorists of probability for diverse reasons, whereas psychologists continued to
support research characterized by the absence of a normative model (Cohen 1960,
Cohen and Hansel 1957). Fréchet’s goal was an experimental proof that the
Bayesian model is not descriptive (Fréchet 1951, 1954 and 1955). As for
de Finetti, degrees of belief are the very foundation of his Bayesian theory: For
this author, psychology allows one to study individuals’ coherence, and even to
correct their possible errors (de Finetti 1957, 1963 and 1990). The attraction that
the empirical domain exerts on theorists was even played out in certain empirical
work, which could be directly tied to psychology (see Fréchet 1954, de Finetti
1963 and 1965). Similarly, the first study to explicitly use the Bayesian model as a
reference was directed by a theorists of probability (Rouanet 1961). The article of
reference, which opened the Bayesian model field of research towards the study
of probabilistic judgment, was co-signed by probability theorists and a
psychologist (Edwards et al. 1963). Finally, some psychologists advocate the use
of the Bayesian model as a norm of reference because of its intrinsic “descriptive
qualities” applicable to human judgment (Ajzen and Fishbein 1975, McCauley
and Stitt 1978, Peterson and Beach 1967).
3.2. A problem of definition
The absence of a precise definition of Bayesianism is the source of a second
surprise. In experiments that use it as a normative model of reference, predictions
derived from it are compared to participants’ answers. If there is a divergence, the
studies conclude either that participants are irrational or that the Bayesian model
presents poor descriptive properties, without having clearly defined, from the
start, what Bayesianism is. Like for any model, Bayesianism has its own
constraints and implications, which must be identified before any experimental
work. We review the three main – often implicit – uses of the word
“Bayesianism” that can be found.
(i) In psychological literature, there appears to be an implicit convention
according to which the term “Bayesianism” is almost always equated with the
simple use of Bayes’ identity (Ajzen and Fishbein 1975 and 1978, Bar-Hillel
1980, Beyth-Marom and Arkes 1983, Birbaum 1983, Chase et al. 1998, Fischhoff
and Lichtenstein 1978, Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 1995, Girotto 1994, Griffin and
Tversky 1992, Kahneman and Tversky 1972b and 1973, Lewis and Keren 1999,
Lopes 1985, Manktelow 1999, McCauley and Stitt 1978, Mellers and McGraw
1999, McKenzie 1994a, Slovic and Lichtenstein 1971, Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer
72001, Stanovich and West 1999, Wolfe 1995). In these articles, the terms
“Bayesian” or “Bayesianism” just refer to the use of Bayes’ identity.2
This convention is visible in the main paradigms of the literature on base rate
neglect where the experimenter supplies the base rate information in the
instructions. This information is deemed by the experimenter to be the only
possible prior probability. The experimenter also supplies a message (quantitative
or qualitative), representing the evidence, which allows a calculation of
likelihood. The experimenter then calculates the posterior probability with Bayes’
identity. Participants’ responses are then compared to this reference result. Several
tasks applying this paradigm have become famous; they are the “urn and chip”
problem, in the spotlight during the 1960’s (Rouanet 1961), the “medical
diagnosis” problem (Hammerton 1973), the “cab problem” (Kahneman and
Tversky 1972a), and the “engineer-lawyer problem” (Kahneman and Tversky
1973).
(ii) Another conventional use of the term “Bayesianism” occurs sometimes as
a synonym of probability theory, without offering an interpretation of the concept
of probability. A violation of the axioms of probability theory by participants is
then characterized as a non-Bayesian behavior. One such example concerns the
“conjunction fallacy” (Tversky and Kahneman 1982). Commentators of these
observations often conclude to the non-Bayesian thought of participants
(Piatelli-Palmerini 1994), which is an over-specification, given that the results go
against probability theory at large (and only, as a particular case, against
Bayesianism).
(iii) Finally, occasionally the term “Bayesianism” is associated with a
subjective interpretation of probability (Edwards 1968, Fischhoff and
Beyth-Marom 1983, Tversky 1974, Wallsten and Budescu 1983).3 However,
specifications concerning the constraints and, above all, the consequences of this
kind of interpretation for experimental work are left unspecified. For instance, in
one of the most famous and most often quoted papers in the literature on
probability judgment, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) explicitly take the viewpoint
of subjective probability. They acknowledge that, from this viewpoint, “any set of
internally consistent probability judgments is as good as any other” (p. 1130). It is
nevertheless in this paper that they have summarized the results of their research
program on heuristics and biases obtained by using a standard methodology which
is appropriate for studies of the calibration type but, as will be shown in a later
section, is incompatible with the subjective interpretation of probability if it aims
to study coherence. There are, however, a few exceptions that deserve to be
highlighted, such as John Cohen (1960) and Phillips (1970). Cohen (1960) took
the care to analyze the main interpretations of probability, and specially the
subjective conception which can be found in the writings of Keynes and
                                                
2 For instance, the famous paper by Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) which underscores the
importance of the frequentist format in using Bayes’ identity is entitled, “How to improve
Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats”.
3 Of course, the authoritativeness of many authors mentioned in the present paper is
acknowledged. Our point concerns the use that they had of the term “Bayesianism” in their
writings.
8de Finetti. Phillips (1970) also underlines the subjective character of probability in
Bayesian theory and criticizes the methodology used in the “urn and chip”
problem which is based on the objective interpretation of probability.
In conclusion, with very few exceptions, most investigators of probability
judgment (i) either have conventionally identified the term “Bayesianism” with
the use of Bayes' rule, or (ii) more seriously, have left it undefined, with the
consequence that the adoption, as a norm of reference, of this undefined model,
can only be left unjustified. But if the use of a model is to be justified, it must be
defined rigorously beforehand. In particular, it is essential to specify the
interpretation of probability which underlies Bayesianism, a question to which we
now turn.
4.  Status of Bayesianism in probability theory
As a matter of fact, there are different interpretations of probability. Good
(1950), for example, lists nine interpretations of it. For the time being, we will
limit ourselves to the distinction between the objective and the epistemic
conceptions of probability. The objective interpretation refers to the notion of a
random, empirical, and physical phenomenon. In this case, probability is
understood as a determined and unique object which exists outside the individual.
Notice that according to this interpretation, the concept of the probability of a
single case is hard to conceive of because the repetition of events is necessary to
calculate the probability, which is identified to a frequency. On the other hand, the
epistemic interpretation consists in viewing probability as the result of an
individual's judgment which depends on his/her knowledge. This judgment is
identified with the individual's degree of belief. As will be seen later, the
experimental work cannot remain unaffected by the interpretation that is chosen,
in terms of the paradigms, of the materials, as well as of the interpretation of the
results.
Defining Bayesianism in a unique manner seems extremely difficult. Not
without irony, Good (1971) attributes eleven facets to Bayesianism, and he
underscores the ambiguity of this word on several occasions (Good 1975 and
1976). This stems partly from the lack of independence of the various
interpretations of probability (Good 1971, Kaye 1988) and also from a confusion
between Bayesianism and theories which do no more than using Bayes' identity or
one of its consequences. Using de Finetti's own words, this amounts to
assimilating the “Bayesian standpoint” with the “Bayesian techniques”. Now the
latter, which are the mathematical corpus of probability theory related to the
various ways of stating Bayes' rule (Appendix 1), have been the object of a revival
of interest in the past decade, especially in the Artificial Intelligence community.
In this community, as in mathematics and in the “hard” sciences at large, it has
become common practice to use the term “Bayesianism” in the second sense,
which is perfectly justified. But as the term in its first sense (the “Bayesian
standpoint”) has philosophical and psychological implications, these should be
9made explicit when it appears in the context of psychological investigations. The
nature of the “Bayesian standpoint” should be made explicit before debating about
its use.
In his famous 1763  essay, Thomas Bayes defined the essence of what was
subsequently called “Bayes' identity”.4 In the same work, he recommended
resorting to a uniform prior probability distribution in a situation of total
ignorance (subsequently called the “principle of indifference”). It has been
suggested that these two principles could constitute the foundation of what is
commonly called “Bayesianism” (Gillies 1987). However, they do not allow a
satisfactory characterization, whether separately or jointly. One, the acceptance of
Bayes’s rule underdetermines the adherence to Bayesianism, whatever it may be,
because the use of this rule constitutes the basisof the “Bayesian techniques”
which are endorsed by anyone who understands elementary algebraic calculation;
in brief, this criterion cannot be a discriminating criterion to define Bayesianism:
The various formulations of Bayes' rule are permitted in all different possible
interpretations of probability (Allais 1983). Two, the principle of indifference is
not sufficient of its own, or even in conjunction with the adoption of Bayes’ rule
because, while it makes an hypothesis regarding probability distributions, it fails
to provide a definition of the concept of probability.
A solution to this definitional problem can be found in the writings of a
few authors who have proposed a global definition of the Bayesian standpoint
focused essentially on the internal coherence of an individual's judgment
(Gärdenfors 1988, Good 1971 and 1976, Skyrms 1975; and, in a more elaborate
form, Seidenfeld 1979). In line with this approach, a general definition of
Bayesianism will now be proposed, based on three criteria: One general epistemic
criterion and two criteria defining a double notion of coherence (Baratgin 2002a);
see also for a similar presentation Seidenfeld 1979).
(a) Epistemic criterion
An individual’s degrees of belief are interpreted in terms of probability. Any
person is supposed to be able to assign a probability of realization to any event,
including single occurrences. This obtains even in a situation of uncertainty or
total ignorance. The conception of probability theory as a way of modeling
degrees of belief indicates that probability is completely subjective. Following
this epistemic criterion, probability represents the measure of the degree of belief
depending on the individual’s (general) state of knowledge K, at a given
moment t. This implies that all probabilities are conditional. The degree of belief
in H should be understood as the conditional probability P(H|K). For the sake of
simplicity, let it actually be P(H).
                                                
4 More precisely, what appeared in Bayes' essay is the definition of conditional probability (see the
first formula in Appendix 1). It is Laplace, in his “Mémoire sur la probabilité des causes par les
événements”, who offered, in 1774, the first formulation of Bayes' identity (the second formula in
Appendix 1) (see Laplace 1986).
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The next two criteria define a double notion of coherence that degrees of belief
must respect. One is based on a static hypothesis and the other on a dynamic
hypothesis (Hacking 1967).
(b) Static coherence criterion
Degrees of belief must obey additive probability theory axioms (Kolmogorov’s
axioms, see Appendix 4).
(c) Dynamic coherence criterion
Revision of an individual’s degree of belief given a new evidence D is derived
from Bayes’ rule. This revision can be conducted in two different manners.
First, one can imagine D as certain, and estimate the posterior probability P(H|D)
at a time t0, although at time t0 one has no knowledge whether D will occur or not.
When one estimates P(H|D), one must in fact pretend that D actually occurred at a
time t1 (with t0 < t1).
Second, one may revise ones’ degree of belief upon learning the realization of D.
One would then revise ones’ degree of belief P(H) at time t1 (with t0 < t1) when
one gets informed that D occurred at time t1. Let this probability be PD(H)).
The dynamic coherence criterion also called the “(Bayesian) conditioning
principle” (Hacking 1975, Seidenfeld 1979) posits that the revised probability
upon learning the outcome D at time t1 is equal to the probability of H conditioned
on the (imagined or assumed) evidence D at a moment t0 (that is, P(H|D) yielded
by Bayes’ rule):
(vi)   
€ 
PD(H) = P(H|D).
In fact there is no distinction between a probability assessed conditionally with
regard to a message D, and a probability given the realization of this message D.
Two sub-sets of the various probability theories satisfy the three coherence
criteria (in particular the epistemic criterion). They coincide with a traditional
distinction between two sorts of Bayesianism, namely “logical Bayesianism” and
“subjective Bayesianism” (de Finetti 1972, Earman 1995, Good 1950 and 1975,
Hacking 1975, Kyburg 1961, Seidenfeld 1979, Walley 1991). The difference
coincides in turn with the opposition made by Kyburg (1988) between epistemic
and doxastic uncertainty.
• Logical Bayesianism
For logical Bayesians (Cox 1946, Good 1950, Jaynes 1994, Jeffreys 1931, Keynes
– the founder – 1921) subjective probability is epistemic in the sense that it results
from an evaluation based on the body of evidence that is available and does not
depend on the agents’ state of mind. More precisely, for logical Bayesians, two
individuals with the same state of knowledge will emit the same judgment of
probability. In other words, there is a unique distribution of probability for a given
state of knowledge. With regard to the dynamic process of probability revision,
two individuals with the same state of knowledge are supposed to make the same
11
revision when they receive the same message. Logical Bayesians justify the status
of Kolmogorov's axioms by an appeal to desiderata that specify logical coherence
(Cox 1946, Good 1950, Jaynes 1994).
• Subjective Bayesianism
For subjectivists, probability depends on the general state of mind of the
individual expressing a belief. Its doxastic character implies that no unique
probability exists even if one considers that the body of evidence is given. This
allows two agents with the same state of knowledge to formulate two different
evaluations of probability, as long as these evaluations are coherent (in the static
and dynamic senses). However, in certain situations, one may hope that the
evaluations of many individuals converge towards the same judgment. For
example, most people may think that flipping a fair coin presents a probability of
1/2 for landing heads-up. But, in many situations, even people with the same
knowledge will give diverging judgments. In other words, there is no unique
distribution of probability for a given state of knowledge. Taking an agent’s state
of mind into account also reflects on the dynamic process of revision of degrees of
belief. There can indeed be a difference in the way two individuals acquaint
themselves with one given message. Two individuals may revise their degrees of
belief differently, even if they receive the same information, because each one
will go about the revision in keeping with their own “state of mind”. The notion
that acquiring a piece of knowledge includes subjectivism was developed by
Ramsey (1926), and independently with a few nuances by de Finetti (1930, 1993,
1964 and 1990). The necessity for an agent to obey Kolmogorov’s axioms (the
static coherence criterion) is defined by the “Dutch book” argument:5 The agent's
degree of belief in an event can be revealed by the odds at which he is willing to
bet on this event. The simple argument of coherence, namely, avoiding the
possibility that an opponent wins with certainty whatever the outcome, leads to
Kolmogorov's axioms and to the definition of conditional probability (de Finetti
1930 and 1964, Ramsey 1926; see also, for a discussion of this argument, Skyrms
1975).
In the light of either one of these two interpretations, Bayesianism appears to be a
clear candidate for a model defining a behavioral norm of human probabilistic
judgment. The two fundamental varieties are invested with the same normative
aspect. The theory should serve as a guide for human probability judgment (see
de Finetti 1965 and 1976, Jaynes 1994). However, only the subjectivists
sometimes present the normative theory as a possible candidate for a descriptive
theory of reality:
The rules of the calculus of probability, conceived as conditions necessary
to insure coherence among the assignments of probability of a given
                                                
5 Other justifications for using Kolmogorov's axioms as coherence constraints have been put
forward by subjective Bayesians, such as the “scoring rules” argument (de Finetti 1963) or
Savage’s (1954) model of subjective expected utility.
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individual, constitute, in fact, only the precise expressions of the rules of
the logic of the probable which are applied in an unconscious manner
qualitatively if not numerically, by all men in all circumstances of life.
(de Finetti 1964, p. 111).
According to supporters of subjectivism, the experimental study of probability
judgment is indispensable to identify people’s possible errors and subsequently
improve their spontaneous judgments (de Finetti 1961, 1963 and 1976). It seems
natural for psychologists whose main objective is to study people’s degrees of
belief to consider a theoretical model that characterizes the individual’s idealized
doxastic states. In psychology, some authoritative researchers have explicitly
referred to “subjective Bayesianism” while choosing a model of reference
(Edwards et al. 1963, Edwards and Phillips 1964, Kahneman et al. 1982, Tversky
1974). This is why it is this subjective interpretation of Bayesianism that will be
considered in what follows.
5.  Constraints of Bayesianism on experimental studies
We now possess a normative model of reference for probability judgment clearly
defined by the three criteria listed earlier: An agent is coherent in the Bayesian
sense just adopted if the agent’s degrees of belief (which are conditioned on
his/her general set of beliefs) respect the axioms of Kolmogorov (static
coherence) and the agent revises them by Bayes’ rule (dynamic coherence). We
are in a position to answer the question that motivates the present study, as we can
identify the constraints on the experimental methodology resulting from the
criteria within the subjective interpretation of probability. We will examine the
extent to which these constraints have been satisfied in psychological studies,
while considering whether they can be satisfied in principle.
5.1. Applying a pragmatic approach to the experimental study of probability
judgment and revision
In psychological experiments on thinking, participants are typically presented
with the statement of a problem that refers to general knowledge or that is
integrated in an original specific scenario, following which either they are
provided with a result and asked to decide whether or not it follows from the
statement (the evaluation paradigm) or they are asked to calculate or evaluate the
value of a variable (the problem solving paradigm). From the experimenter’s point
of view, the derivation of the response is justified by the application of principles
specific to the domain under study (e. g., physics, economics, probability, etc.)
These principles belong to a theoretical model (either normative or descriptive)
which it is the aim of the experiment to assess by examining participants'
performance. In the experiments on judgment, the question is often a request for a
comparison or for a qualitative or a quantitative evaluation, etc. The experiment
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may be administered orally during an interview with the experimenter, or in a
written form, using paper and pencil or a computer. Whether the presence of the
experimenter is physically real or mediated by the support of a written message,
there are two interlocutors actually engaged in a communication, so that it is
appropriate to apply a conversational analysis of this communication. In
particular, laws of language use in the spirit of Grice’s (1989) maxims of
conversation are applicable.
After they have been provided with the instructions and the problem
statement, the participants are presented with the target question. Like any
utterance, this question must be interpreted. Generally, its meaning is not
straightforwardly identifiable because the information may be more or less long,
conceptually hard, vague or ambiguous. As for any question, its interpretation is
determined by the content of the putative answer: The answer should satisfy the
expectation of relevance attributed by the participant to the experimenter. The
term “relevance” is being used here in its theoretical sense (Sperber and Wilson
1995): An utterance is relevant if it has cognitive effects for the hearer; these
consist in altering degrees of belief or in drawing contextual conclusions, that is,
conclusions that follow from the message together with previous information.
Now, in experimental settings (as well as in instructional settings, and
more generally in testing situations) the participants are aware that the question
put to them is a higher order question, that is, the question implicates “the
experimenter wants to know whether I know how to find the answer”. The
interpretation of the question is determined in part, and revealed, by the specific
kind of knowledge that the participant chooses to exhibit through his/her
response: The participant bases this choice on the assumption that what is relevant
to the experimenter is to know whether the participant has that kind of knowledge.
This choice and the underlying assumption reveal in turn the participant's
representation of the task. This is why knowledge of the population tested is
essential. The experimenter must anticipate the range of questions of interest that
participants are likely to attribute to him/her, in the light of their educational and
cultural backgrounds. This should contribute to the determination of the verbal
and non verbal materials to use in order to avoid possible misinterpretations of the
task or, when using standard paradigms, this requires a macroanalysis of the
information provided. Until the late 1980’s, these issues were neglected by
investigators of thinking and reasoning, even though social psychologists had
related interests in the past that were linked to concerns about the transparency of
the experiment (see the concept of demand characteristics proposed by Orne
1962).
There is, in addition, another kind of analysis, based on linguistic
pragmatics, which needs to be applied to the sentences used to state the problem.
The output of this analysis is the determination of the interpretation of the
statement and question that the participant is likely to work out; it delivers the
actual proposition(s) that will be processed during the inferential and judgmental
treatment, taking into account the frame of the task representation. The reason to
perform this microanalysis is that it is an essential step to guarantee the validity of
the experimental task. Indeed the experimenter is interested in the processing of
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specific information which he/she expects the participant to recover from the
sentences used in the problem statement. Unluckily, the interpretation of the
message reached by the participant often differs sharply from the interpretation
intended by the experimenter. The latter typically (although not automatically)
wishes to communicate the literal meaning of the problem statement, whereas the
former often adds some meaning. It is an essential part of pragmatic theory to
explain by which process this implied meaning, called an implicature, is
generated by the hearer (here, the participant). It is clear that a judgment can be
deemed to have been made in accordance with some principle only to the extent
that the interpretation of the problem statement and of the question made by the
participant and the experimenter coincide. This approach to the experimental
study of thinking and reasoning, often called “conversational approach”, has been
suggested or applied by a number of researchers (Adler 1991, Hilton 1995,
Macchi 2000, Politzer 1986 and 1991, Politzer and Macchi 2000, Schwarz 1996).
It is quite general and can change our understanding of some tasks radically (see
Sperber et al. 1995 for Wason’s selection task). In the field of probability
judgment, it sheds new light on a few classic tasks used to study the base rate
fallacy (Krosnick et al. 1990, Macchi 1994 and 1995, Schwarz et al. 1991,
Politzer and Macchi 2005) or the conjunction fallacy (Dulany and Hilton 1991,
Politzer and Noveck 1991). Now, there is a supplementary reason to plead for the
use of language pragmatics in the case of probability judgment when the chosen
model is Bayesian. Pragmatic analysis is mandatory in order to identify the
participant’s interpretation of the experimenter’s message; in the specific case of
revision, this concern applied to the new information (the evidence) is even more
crucial. The linguistic theory explains how an individual reaches the interpretation
of a message (what is communicated) which often differs sharply from the
linguistic meaning of the message (what is expressed). This interpretation has a
propositional form to which a degree of belief is attached. This interpretation
process is essentially individual and there is no reason why its product should be
identical from one person to another (Shafer 1985). In brief, the inferential
process of belief formation that results from communication is one of the main
concerns of pragmatics; since Bayesianism posits that the agent emits
probabilities (i.e., degrees of belief) as a function of what (s)he knows and learns,
it is clear that the experimental study of Bayesian probability judgment and
revision must rely on pragmatic theory. We consider in turn the constraints
imposed by the three criteria in the light of pragmatics.
5.2. Constraints due to the epistemic criterion
Within the subjective interpretation of Bayesianism, a consequence of the
epistemic criterion is that in experimental situations, the subjective character of
participants’ probabilities must be taken into account. For Bayesians, “probability
does not exist” (de Finetti 1990 and 1976), in the sense that probability
corresponds to a degree of belief with the same ontological status as any belief or
opinion. This interpretation is at variance with the frequentist interpretation, for
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which probability exists as a mathematical or an empirical object.6 This difference
is even more marked for the notion of prior probability in Bayes’ identity
(de Finetti 1951). This is because the evaluation of the initial probability P(H) is
closely linked to the interpretation of probability that is adopted. For Bayesians,
this prior probability is always a conditional probability. This is so in Bayes’
identity: 
  
€ 
P(H|D) = P(D|H)P(H)P(D)     in which P(H) and P(D) are to be
understood as probabilities relative to our current knowledge (de Finetti 1951 and
1972). They are conditional probabilities with respect to the individuals’ initial
knowledge K and set of beliefs B (P(H) = P(H|K, B)).7 From a Bayesian point of
view, it is impossible to estimate participants’ probability without knowing
precisely their set of beliefs together with the conditions on which they express
their probability.
Thus, because probability has no objective value, a probability judgment is
never correct or incorrect. This implies that we can in no way judge the quality of
an answer taken in isolation from the individual’s set of beliefs. De Finetti (1970)
warned that the question should specify the information with regard to which
individuals are asked to condition their probability. From a modern, pragmatically
based viewpoint, these conditions are often epistemic implicatures that may, or
may not be drawn, depending on the representation of the task. He also made it
clear that the questions should refer to specified events rather than to classes of
events, for which an additional assumption of uniformity may, or may not be
made, by the individual. Even more drastically, he claimed that “an event is a
specified assertion rather than a specified fact” (p. 131). It follows that even if two
assertions are co-referential, the “events” referred to may not be given the same
probability. So, besides the fact that semantic variation affects the degree of belief
in an event, when such a variation is possible, pragmatic effects may be induced,
based on the existence of a contrastive choice: Using one expression rather than
another available co-referential expression may generate an epistemic implicature
which affects the degree of belief.
In summary, one may well be coherent from a Bayesian point of view, and
yet give an evaluation that is very far-off from an expert's evaluation because the
individual's initial set of beliefs may not reflect an objective state of the world or
the expert’s evaluation of it. Is there a means to access these degrees of belief?
Before considering this question, which concerns individuals, we consider the
question of the statistical treatment of the results obtained from a group of
individuals.
                                                
6 However, Bayesian theory does not automatically reject frequentist information in order to work
out (subjective) probability estimate. It may be the case that a coherent subjective judgment of an
event probability equals the frequency of occurrence of this event (de Finetti 1964).
7 According to the frequentist interpretation, probability is defined as the limit of a frequency. It is
unique and in no case does it depend on the individuals’ knowledge (the epistemic criterion is not
respected). In this view, the phrase “the probability of event E is P” indicates that probability of
event E is a property of the event itself which possesses an objective value that can be calculated
or approximated by means of logical or physical operations.
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It has been a long time since Newell (1981) criticized the common method
used in the study of thinking, which presupposes that all participants solve
problems in the same way, a methodological error which he called “the
fixed-method fallacy”. More recently, the notion that there are individual
strategies in reasoning has been more and more accepted (Schaeken et al. 2000).
As far as the subjectivist Bayesian model is concerned, the situation is even more
radical: No two participants can a priori be assumed to be equivalent. In effect, if
it is assumed that each participant is characterized by his/her own initial set of
beliefs, and arrives at a probability estimate (the result communicated to the
experimenter) that is dependent on it, the former as well as the latter may differ
from one participant to the other. In addition, personality factors may influence
participants’ degrees of belief. For example, for a same state of knowledge, there
is a tendency among anxious participants to overestimate the probability of a
serious negative event, as compared to non anxious participants (Beck 1976). The
consequence is inescapable: In order to study individual coherence, averaging
data across participants is meaningless, and only individual-based differential
measures are adequate. This questions the adequacy of the studies devoted to
probability judgment in the past decades, as most of them have used statistics
based on averaged data. Of course, the observation that, say, eighty percent of a
population commit what looks like the violation of a law of probability points to a
phenomenon that requires an explanation; but the phenomenon does not
necessarily reveal a lack of coherence in the Bayesian sense. This may be the
case, but in order to demonstrate it, the methodological requirements that we are
reviewing in this and the next Sections must be satisfied.
We now consider the question of the participants’ degrees of belief in
experimental settings. There are two related problems. One is the problem of how
to specify for the participants an uncertain situation without introducing
uncontrolled factors susceptible of altering their degrees of belief; the other is the
problem of the measurement of these degrees of belief.
It is a reasonable assumption that the representation of the task and the
confidence in the statements which frame an experimental situation are in a
relation of mutual adjustment. On one hand, the nature of these statements (e.g.,
overtly fictitious or explicitly pertaining to scientific knowledge, in particular
mathematical, etc.) contribute to the representation of the task (e. g., participants
think they should draw on their imagination, or on their knowledge and
mathematical skills). On the other hand, the representation of the task contributes
in turn to define subjective probability: In one type of task, it may be appropriate
to assume that a propositional content is certain whereas in another one the same
assumption might be inappropriate. In brief, the choice of the materials, content
and questions should not only be determined by the theoretical concept that the
experiment aims to investigate and by the population (as in any study of thinking);
in addition, this choice should be made with a view to fixing, or at least
controlling, the participant’s degree of belief in the critical propositional content
of the problem statements.
To what extent has the epistemic character of probability been taken into
account in past studies? Most of the time, experimenters consciously or not have
17
adopted an objective interpretation of probability. Presenting a probability
numerically reflects the assumption that it exists independently of the
experimenter. What the studies actually achieve is a comparison between the
participants’ answer and the “true probability” calculated by the experimenter.
From a Bayesian point of view, independently of whether or not these studies
show correct calibration of participants’ probabilities – the majority, in fact, show
bad calibration – this methodology is not focused on individual coherence, but
rather on a rationale of analysis of accuracy, where the experimenter plays the role
of the expert who formulates “correct predictions”. Therefore, arguments which
are supposed to demonstrate the non-Bayesian character of human probability
revision (like exploiting the phenomena of conservatism, of base rate neglect, or
the effect of the frequentist format) do not appear to infirm the Bayesian
hypothesis of coherence. The epistemic criterion applies to all probabilities: Prior
probabilities, likelihoods and posterior probabilities. In particular, base rates, used
as prior probabilities by the experimenter, do not necessarily constitute the prior
probabilities considered by the participants, as de Finetti and Savage warned:
From a subjective point of view, prior probabilities are arbitrary in the
sense that logic or experimental knowledge are not sufficient to impose or
exclude the choice of any specific distribution. But in fact, they are not
totally arbitrary, for they make sense only insofar as any of these
distributions has been chosen by an individual in order to represent his
opinion (de Finetti and Savage 1962, pp. 83-84, our translation).
Furthermore, as we have seen, they are not necessarily equal across
individuals. Thus as many authors have already remarked, an agent’s failure to
use base rates as prior probabilities is not a sign of non-Bayesian behavior
(Cosmides and Tooby 1996, Gigerenzer and Murray 1987, Kahneman and
Tversky 1983, Koehler 1996, Levi 1981 and 1983, Logue 1995, Niiniluoto 1981,
McCauley 1996, McKenzie 1994b, Phillips 1970, Skyrms 1981). But, more
fundamentally, one might question the very possibility of knowing the prior
probability used by each participant. As far as the target estimate is concerned, it
should ideally be expressed spontaneously, because the mere request for such an
expression changes the individual’s initial set of beliefs, so that the belief that is
actually measured is conditioned on a new set of beliefs, namely the initial state
modified by the request (Borel 1939). It seems doubtful that this requirement can
be satisfied while using the usual tasks in which scenarios are presented.
Since the sixties, various techniques of assessment have been proposed in
order to measure subjective prior probabilities. The main result of these studies
indicates that different techniques may prompt different responses (see for
example Seaver et al. 1978, Winkler 1967). Yates (1990) distinguishes two kinds
of assessment techniques, which recalls statement methods and inference methods
(see also Chesley 1975). In the statement methods “the opinion is conveyed by a
likelihood statement, an explicit pronouncement of a person’s degree of certainty
that an event will happen” (Yates 1990, p. 16). In the inference method, the
degree of belief is inferred from the behaviour of individuals who are engaged in
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activities such as betting or lotteries. Now, a drawback of the majority of
statement methods is that experimenters are prevented from applying these
techniques to non experts as these methods are based on metacognitive knowledge
of probability distributions and, more generally, of probability theory (see
Winkler 1967). Only two statement methods appear suitable at first sight: The
magnitude estimation, which consists of asking what is the probability that X is
less than or equal to Y, and the ratio estimation. Unfortunately, although the
former seems easy to understand by naive participants, it requires the intervention
of a reference for which on can suspect within-subject variance. In addition, the
latter seems to rely on participants’ familiarity with odds, which seriously limits
the possibility to draw general conclusions: Indeed, as noted by Wright (1988)
“people do not adequately understand odds as a response mode without extensive
training”.
Among the inference methods are the use of betting and lotteries. In both
cases, the individual is asked to make a choice between two or more alternatives,
and the experimenter infers the probability from the expressed preferences or
indifferences. Unfortunately, these methods actually reveal both utility and
probability in the form of expected utility and cannot be considered as appropriate
to measure pure subjective probability.
In conclusion, the appropriate methods to measure subjective probabilities
are still to be discovered in order to be confidently applied to a population not
familiar with betting and probability theory. This conclusion holds even though on
several occasions de Finetti proposed an operational definition of probability that
reveals belief by means of an induced behaviour. This is the argument of “scoring
rules” (de Finetti 1962, 1963, 1965, 1970 and 1990). In phase 1, participants
attach a number x to each event E. In phase 2, on the outcome, participants
receive a penalty of x2 if the event E becomes true and a penalty of (1-x)2 if E does
not turn out to be true. In the assessor's view, the value of x needs to be the one
that is the closer to the participant's degree of beliefs in order to minimise the
expected loss (see de Finetti 1990 for a proof). This method is often used in
experiments based on forecasts of real events (sport results, marketing,
management accounting) in which experimenters strive to assess the accuracy of
participants' responses. However, this method does not seem directly suitable for
tasks requiring forecasts of fictional events as can be found in experiments of
psychology (because it is necessary that one should know whether or not the
target event has occurred). As a consequence, serious questions on the validity of
these studies can be raised, as this method is the only one acknowledged by
subjectivist Bayesians.
In summary, the epistemic criterion has deep psychological implications;
whether related assumptions are plausible, and in the affirmative, whether the
constraints which they impose can be satisfied in the laboratory, are fundamental
questions. The validity of the experimental investigation of probability judgment,
past and future, depends on the answers to these questions. We have presented
reasons to doubt that that the answers can be affirmative.
Hopefully, new paradigms may be discovered, which will enable
investigators to overcome the difficulties linked to the representation of the task.
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However, even if the experimenter controls the message actually received by the
participant, the former has no access to the state of belief of the latter. Then, the
following question arises: How to investigate an individual's revision whose initial
set of beliefs is not well known and may not have even remained stable by the
time the new message reaches him or her ? It is not clear whether one can find an
answer. In other words, even if one could eliminate the source of uncertainty that
is of a pragmatic nature, there would still remain a fundamental uncertainty based
on the experimenter's incomplete knowledge of the participant's set of beliefs.
5.3. Constraints due to the static coherence criterion
Let us assume nevertheless that the conditions of the interaction with the
experimenter and the experimental materials are such that the participants can
express their actual degrees of belief. Let us assume also that we have an
operational definition of a degree of belief through an appropriate behavior. We
now envisage the consequences of Kolmogorov’s axioms on the experimental
methodology.
The first axiom will not be discussed, as it can hardly be regarded as a
constraint. Rather, it is a convention by which numerical values are attributed to
the lower and the upper bound of the scale of measurement of degrees of belief.
The second axiom posits that the measure of a probability maps events
onto real numbers strictly comprised between 0 and 1. Now, the psychological
status of this scale should be carefully considered: On one hand, the scale can be
used for purpose of communication, and it is no more than a useful conventional
tool. It is not illegitimate, but it requires at least some justification which is
seldom found in the psychological literature. De Finetti (1962) compares it with a
temperature scale: By training and experience, people become able to translate
their degrees of belief into numbers as they do for their perception of temperature.
On the other hand, it may be tempting to give the ]0, 1[ scale the status of a format
of mental representation for degrees of belief. But, of course, this has little
psychological plausibility, and it is incompatible with subjective Bayesianism.
From this viewpoint, probabilities are essentially qualitative degrees of belief
which are not mentally represented by numbers, let alone real numbers (except,
once again, at a metacognitive level as a result of training or formal instruction). It
is true that in some situations, people can express probabilities by fractions, but
these situations constitute a special case where they deal with countable sets of
possibilities.
The common practice that consists of using a numeric scale when asking
participants to express their probability, as well as when discussing results by
comparing participants’ responses against a calculated value that belongs to the
scale, introduces an illusion of accuracy. In addition, this might cue participants
towards representing the task as a mathematical exercise and solving it
accordingly, whereas using non numeric presentation might be more neutral.
Leaving aside metacognitive uses of probability, people usually express their
degrees of belief in natural language using non numeric expressions: Expressions
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of frequency (never, seldom, often …) or of certainty (doubtful, likely, sure …)
that are susceptible of being ranked on various scales. There is a large body of
research on uncertainty expressions; a few have concerned themselves with the
relative merits of verbal and numeric scales (Budescu et al. 1988, Erev and Cohen
1990, González-Vallejo et al. 1994, Rapoport et al. 1990, Windschitl and Wells
1996, Zimmer 1983). Among the investigations that aim to determine the
mapping between numeric and verbal scales, there is a frequent implicit
assumption to the effect that the numeric scale would represent the “correct”
scale. Moxey and Sanford (2000) remark that the question addressed has been
“how accurate are verbal expressions”, rather than “what different patterns of
thought and reasoning might be set up by numbers and verbal expressions”.
Comparing a verbal scale with a numeric scale belongs to a calibration
methodology. It is true that verbal expressions are more natural, as they are not
based on a mathematical convention. But the important point is that from
subjective Bayesian point of view, both kinds of scale are but a way of
communicating degrees of belief, and that the only interesting quality of this
communication tool is its capacity to help observe changes in degree of belief
susceptible of revealing internal coherence or lack thereof. From this viewpoint,
the literature in question does not seem conclusive.
The study of the additivity axiom, and of its corollary, the constraint of
complementarity, implies, from the Bayesian point of view, the use of a
within-participant methodology together with the control of the pragmatic factors.
To our knowledge, this has never been applied (see Baratgin 2002a for a review).
In case an apparent violation would be observed within-participant (for example,
suppose that Pparticipant(A∪B)>Pparticipant(A)+Pparticipant(B)), the experimenter should
verify that A∩B is assumed by the participants to be empty. Several
within-participants studies show a possible violation of the complementarity
constraint: Robinson and Hastie 1985, van Wallendael and Hastie 1990,
Villejoubert and Mandel 2002, Windschitl 2000). However, in none of these
studies did the experimenters verify whether their definition of the set of the
possible alternative hypotheses coincided with that of the participants.
Furthermore, the experimenter should be in a position to make sure that the
probability estimated by the participant coincides with the target probability. It is
not clear whether this is possible in principle.8
A similar, and even greater difficulty arises with the fourth axiom (which
introduces the concept of conditional probability, Appendix 4) as the
experimenter should ascertain within-participant that:   
€ 
P(H∩G) = P(H)P(D|H) .
                                                
8 The Bayesian model relies on a very constraining criterion of coherence due to the axiom of
additivity of probabilities. As we have underlined, other possible ways to model degrees of belief
exist, based on a weaker coherence criterion obtained by loosening the axiom of additivity. For
each of these normative models, theorists have proposed specific sets of axioms that degrees of
belief should satisfy. From a technical point of view, some of these models, and notably all of the
probability interval models, can be considered as generalizations of the Bayesian model (and
especially of its subjective variety, see Walley 1991) with less constraining criteria, rather than
alternatives to it. Taking these models as norms of reference would relax the constraint of
additivity, but would not solve the methodological difficulties already mentioned.
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In summary, Kolmogorov’s axioms impose constraining hypotheses on the
nature and the processing of degrees of belief. Before assessing people’s
performance in probability judgment by way of the Bayesian model, one ought to
consider the psychological status of these hypotheses in terms of their plausibility.
Either the plausibility of the hypotheses is debatable, or it is not clear how they
can be verified, or both.
5.4. Constraints due to the dynamic coherence criterion
The first step in order to study the criterion of dynamic coherence is to check
whether the agents respect the criterion of static coherence. In effect, a violation
of Kolmogorov’s axioms might have consequences on the revision process. For
example, there are cases where the violation of the complementarity constraint is
accompanied with conservatism (Marks and Clarkson 1972; Phillips, Hay and
Edwards 1966) or with base rate neglect (Baratgin and Noveck 2000, Davidson
and Hirtle 1990).
Assuming the static coherence criterion to be satisfied, to study the
dynamic coherence of answers is to examine the agents’ respect of the
“conditioning principle”. The probability revised in relation to imagined evidence
must be equal to the probability revised in relation to the same evidence once it is
realized.
As a consequence, before any request for a revised probability estimate,
the prior estimate should be independently measured. For instance, in the cab
problem, participants’ degree of belief in a cab being blue should be obtained
(using an appropriate method of measurement) prior to the witness’ information.
However, this method could create problems. It might be the case that, when
learning the new message, the participants in fact use a prior probability that
differs from the prior probability expressed before learning the new message.
Another consequence is that it is essential that the experimenter control the
source and conditions of delivery of the new message. The reason is that the
degree of belief in the new information depends on the reliability of the source.
For instance, an individual who needs to retrieve information from long-term
memory may feel more or less confident in the truth of that information and give
it more or less high subjective probability.
On the methodological side, clearly, the classic paradigms are not dynamic
examples of probability revision. In almost all of the studies, both the base rate
information (supposed to be the prior probability) and an informative message are
provided. The dynamic process of revision cannot be studied in this purely static
context. One would at least need to know the prior probability for each
participant, in order to know how (s)he modifies it once (s)he is aware of a new
message.9
                                                
9 Results of the few studies that follow this methodology indicate that participants produce revised
probabilities close to those calculated by the experimenter using Bayes’ identity and participants’
prior probabilities and likelihoods as input (for example: Baratgin 2002b, Evans et al. 1985,
McCauley and Stitt 1978, Peterson et al. 1965).
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The respect of the “conditioning principle” has never been considered in
classic studies on conservatism and base rate neglect, and has been studied very
little in a direct fashion (see, however, Waller and Mitchell 1991). Some results in
the existing literature can be understood as violations of this criterion. This is the
case, for example, with the result observed by Gigerenzer, Hell and Blank (1988,
experiment 1) for the engineer-lawyer problem compared to Kahneman and
Tversky’s study in 1973. In this experiment, participants personally draw at
random the personality descriptions, whereas in the initial paradigm, participants
are informed of the random drawing by a statement. In the initial situation,
participants must “imagine” the random drawing (the evidence D), while in
Gigerenzer et al.’s (1988) situation, they learn of the evidence D directly. In this
case, there is a better use of base rates in Kahneman and Tversky’s condition.
Thus, participants seem to have degrees of belief different in case they learn
evidence D than in case they imagine D (see also Baratgin and Noveck 2000). For
logical Bayesians, this result may indicate a violation of the principle of Bayesian
conditioning. From a subjective viewpoint, it is hardly adequate to speak of a
violation because pragmatically the evidence D is not the same in the two
situations. In Kahneman and Tversky’s (1973) situation, the information of the
random drawing (D) is not “understood” as certain by the participant, who learns
in fact a reported observation (D*). If this is the case, the result can be explained
by the difference in conditional probabilities between the two experiments
(P(H|D*) ≠ P(H|D) if D* ≠ D)). In addition, in order to consider the possibility
that a violation of the Bayesian principle of conditioning has occurred, the result
should be obtained in a within-participant design.
One may question the feasibility of experimentally testing the conditioning
principle, PD(H) = P(H|D) for essentially pragmatic reasons. In order to perform
such a test, an individual should be instructed to imagine or assume that D
occurred and asked to give an estimate of P(H) (i.e., PD(H)); then, the same
individual should be told or given evidence that D actually occurred and finally
asked an estimate of P(H) (i.e., P(H|D)). But such a sequence of questions which
have great apparent similarity can only look anomalous to the participant. Ideally,
the participants should express their degrees of belief spontaneously, or they
should do so at least on one of the two occasions.
In summary, the implications of the kind of subjectivism which is at the
heart of the concept of probability in the subjective variety of Bayesianism, and
the other kind of subjectivism implied by the same Bayesian point of view, which
stems from the notion that any probability judgment is a conditional probability
that depends on the individuals’ belief, make it doubtful that experimenters can be
faithful to the subjective Bayesian concept of probability, for measurement
reasons and for communication reasons. The use of an unspecified model has
resulted in a practice of “calibration” of participants’ judgment in which the
experimenter plays the role of the expert setting the result, a practice which should
be given up as the aim of this methodology, namely a conclusion about
individuals’ rationality, is unattainable. Also, the importance of the dynamic
aspect of probability revision has not been taken into account. Because the
necessity for the experimenter to understand how the new message is received and
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interpreted by the participants engaged in the process of revising their degrees of
belief has not been recognized, there is a lack of authentic research on the
dynamic coherence embodied in the conditioning principle.
6.  Relativising Bayesianism
Independently of the difficulties encountered in measuring degrees of belief, there
is yet another point to consider, namely the domain of application of the Bayesian
model and its possible limitations for the study of probability revision. We
consider in turn two limits of Bayesianism for the experimental study of
probability revision; they concern the background of revision and the problem of
the null prior.
6.1. The background of revision
As any model, the Bayesian model applies to a specific range of situations. As far
as probability revision is concerned, it limits the background of revision, in the
sense that the hypotheses given in the initial statement always remain unchanged.
This means that the “world” of reference is invariant, so that the situation is that
of a static world. This case of revision, called revising, reflects the entire set of
existing experimental paradigms. In these experiments, the participant cannot
doubt the initial statement’s hypotheses. However, another case of belief revision
exists, one where the new message may announce a change in the initial
hypotheses. In other words, the older world (the initial hypotheses) is modified,
which creates a dynamic world situation. This is the updating case (Katsuno and
Mendelzon 1992).10 Let us consider, for example, a situation where a researcher
submits a paper and is awaiting the referees’ answers. The author’s chances of
being accepted can be estimated by imagining various evidences: We are in a
revising background. Let us now suppose that in that lapse of time, a new article
appears on the same topic, which casts doubt on the chances of the first paper. We
are now in an updating situation. In an updating situation, Bayes’ rule is not the
appropriate rule of revision. Walliser and Zwirn (2002) show that in this case the
adequate rule of revision is Lewis’ rule. Revision is carried out by imaging: An
agent considers a distribution of probability on possible hypotheses (possible
worlds). Following a message invalidating a possible world, the degrees of belief
concerning this world are redistributed over the other possible worlds that the
agent considers as the closest to the invalidated world (Appendix 3). Pearl (2000)
offers a similar analysis in distinguishing between the observation of evidence D
and the observation of a deliberative action causing D (in this later case, Pearl
uses the operator do(D). In the first situation, the world remains unchanged and
Bayesian conditioning by the passive observation of D is justified. In the second
                                                
10 In distinguishing between revising and updating (which are two different kinds of revision), we
follow a well-established distinction in Artificial Intelligence.
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situation, the action do(D) modifies the world and it is Lewis’ rule that captures
this transformation).
Therefore, theorists should carefully consider the domain of application of
the Bayesian model and refrain from a systematic use of Bayes’ rule as a
reference. Moreover, the experimenter should check that the participants’
representation of the task coincides with the type of revision situation intended by
the experimenter.
From an experimental point of view, to our knowledge, the study of
Sloman and Lagnado (2005) is the only one that has taken into account exactly the
particular background of updating.11
6.2. A technical limitation: The case of the null prior
As Bayes’ identity formula shows (see Appendix 1), P(H|D) is a linear function of
P(H). In particular the “absorbing” property of zero applies. If an agent has a null
degree of belief in a hypothesis (P(H) = 0), with Bayes’ identity the degree of
belief in this hypothesis will always remain null, regardless of the new message.
One may think that this constraint is not adapted to the modification of degrees of
belief as observed in real life. Indeed, van Wallendael and Hastie (1990) and
Curley and Golden (1994) have observed the phenomenon of “hypothesis
resurrection”, meaning that hypotheses previously estimated at zero by
participants later have a probability different from zero. Nevertheless, these
studies did not concern themselves with the way people learn new messages.
Pragmatically, this phenomenon raises the problem of requesting quantitative
responses from a participant when individuals’ degrees of belief are close to zero.
This limitation in the use of Bayes’ rule makes it necessary for psychologists to
consider the revision rules that are compatible with the “hypothesis resurrection”
such as Lewis’ rule (see Walliser and Zwirn 2002 for a review of the other
compatible rules).
Lewis’ rule is appropriate as a formal answer to the two limitations of
Bayesianism for the study of probability revision. However, the same operational
difficulties remain as those encountered for the study of the conditioning principle
in relation with the subjective character of the degrees of belief and the message
learnt; they are compounded by another difficulty due to the subjective character
of the notion of a distance between two possible worlds inherent in Lewis’ rule
(Appendix 3).
                                                
11 There is a domain in which the notion of possible worlds seems applicable, and therefore the use
of Lewis’ rule justifiable, namely counterfactual reasoning: Theorists of this domain explicitly
refer to the philosophical discussion of possible worlds (Roese and Olson 1995). More precisely,
the analysis of counterfactuals leads one to consider, on one hand, the ease with which the
antecedent condition can be altered (see Kahneman and Miller’s 1986) construct of mutability, of
which one factor is clearly linked to plausibility or feasibility, and ultimately to the proximity to
the actual world); and on the other hand the closeness of a possible expected outcome to the actual
outcome. It would seem that individuals have an intuitive notion of a “distance between possible
worlds”. This notion is the basis of the process of revising by Lewis’ rule (see Appendix 3).
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One possibility to study probability revision in the two types of situation
(revising and updating) independently of Bayes’ and Lewis’ rules would be to
compare the fundamental qualitative properties by which they differ. These
properties have, in fact, the status of rationality postulates (see Walliser and Zwirn
2002 for a representation of these postulates12). However, it is again difficult to
make this solution operational. Take for example two of the properties derivable
from the postulates which differentiate revising from updating, namely
commutativity and idempotence. The commutativity property of revision simply
indicates that learning message A followed by message B has the same effect as
learning message B followed by message A, if A and B are independent of each
other. The idempotence property stipulates that the arrival of a new message that
is already known should not modify the degree of belief initially assigned to the
same message. These two properties are fulfilled by Bayes’ rule and by Lewis’
rule. Intuitively, the respect of these properties in the revision process seems to be
a reasonable assumption. However, one may have different expectations based on
pragmatic theory. For example, as far as commutativity is concerned, relevance
theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995) would predict an order effect when different
messages appear in turn. Generally, a message has greater contextual effects when
it is learnt in the last position, and this is all the more marked as it is more
strongly opposed to the first message (see also Krosnick et al. 1990) for an
analysis of order effect by pragmatic considerations inspired by Grice’s theory).
Regarding idempotence, pragmatic theory predicts also that upon reception
of a new message that is identical to the preceding one, the agent will search for a
reason for this redundancy and will interpret it, for example, as an indication of its
importance or reliability. These apparent violations of properties of revision rules
cannot be considered as fallacies in the subjective setting of learning of evidence.
Indeed the pragmatic view simply means that the experimenter’s evidence D is
not the same as the one the participant uses. There is a possibility that a strict
subjectivist interpretation of Bayesianism renders the rules unfalsifiable because
any departure from these is susceptible of a pragmatic explanation, given the
standard experimental methodology in which the participant perceives that the
message is directly or indirectly under the experimenter’s control. In other terms,
studying whether there really is a violation of properties implies building
experimental paradigms that are immune from the interpretive factors linked to
the representation of the task. In order to help satisfy this requirement, researchers
should design new paradigms (e. g., leading the participants to believe that they
are finding the evidence themselves in order to proceed with their revisions) or
shift from the laboratory to carefully planned field observation.
In summary, the focusing of the literature regarding probability revision
uniquely on the Bayesian model has resulted in the neglect of other normative
models. One, the notion of coherence is multiple and should not be defined
exclusively within the framework of additive probabilities, on which the Bayesian
                                                
12 For example, one of the important postulates is Strong conservation. It is common to the
systems of axioms for probabilistic revising and updating. It states that if a message is already
validated by the initial belief, the final belief is unchanged: if P(D) = 1, then PD (H) = P(H).
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model is dependent; and two, the Bayesian model confines the experimental study
of probability revision to a situation where the new message does not alter
participants’ set of beliefs (a static world background). Future research should
take into account the various existing models, even though many of them are
generalizations of the Bayesian model. The research on the coherence of
probability revision should be redirected to the revision process in which the
agent’s set of beliefs is modified (a situation of dynamic world). Lewis’ rule is
appropriate in such cases but experimentally it is hard to operationalize. Instead,
one might investigate the rational foundations of Bayes’ rule (for the revising
situation) and Lewis’ rule (for updating situations) but the direct experimental
study of these postulates amounts to testing predictions derived from pragmatic
considerations.
7.  Conclusion
For almost a half-century now, experimental research on probability judgment has
been based on the use of a so-called “Bayesian model”. In spite of this, this stream
of research has failed to carry out a thorough analysis of the conceptual
foundations of the model that could have led to uncover its methodological
constraints and its psychological implications. This has had two broad damaging
consequences.
The first consequence is a failure to distinguish between Bayesian
techniques (i.e., just applying Bayes’ rule as a predictive revision rule) and
Bayesian point of view which implies the adoption of the epistemic character of
probabilities and the fundamental notion of coherence engendered by the model.
In this model, Bayes’ rule is not just a rule of combination of quantitative
probabilities, but it results from both the static coherence axioms (Kolmogorov’s
axioms) and the criterion of dynamic coherence postulating the principle of
conditioning. This misinterpretation of Bayesianism in the experimental literature
has resulted in a failure to recognize the constraints and the implications of the
model for the experimental studies. In the subjective interpretation of
Bayesianism, the experimenter must consider, by definition, any probability
judgment as the simple expression of a degree of belief. In this framework, a
probability judgment can in no case be regarded by the experimenter as true or
false; it can only be regarded as coherent or incoherent, depending on whether it
respects the probability axioms and the conditioning principle.
The second and more fundamental consequence results from the first.
Once the conceptual content of the model has been unveiled, it appears that the
principles which define subjective Bayesianism and the consequences that can be
derived from them are not experimentally testable: This is because there is no
satisfactory operation by which subjective degrees of belief can be measured.
Even if probability could be measured, insuperable methodological difficulties
would remain. These are mainly due to the conditional nature of probability and
the impossibility to access all the relevant conditions on which it depends; in
particular, the operation of measurement is in itself a factor susceptible of altering
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the probability to be measured. The study of the qualitative properties of degrees
of belief, which at first sight could be thought of as an alternative to the study of
the coherence of degrees of belief is also problematic in the subjective
interpretation of Bayesianism. It is hard for the experimenter to come to a
conclusion about possible violations of the properties of the model (like the
rationality postulates and other properties such as commutativity and
idempotence) if they can be explained by pragmatic mechanisms.
Are these reasons sufficient to reject subjective Bayesianism as a
normative model of human probability judgment and revision? Probably not, as
we have not demonstrated its inadequacy. The foregoing analyses indicate that
this is no more possible than to demonstrate its adequacy. Those who wish to
maintain the model may be motivated by the admirable ease and elegance of its
derivation from a simple postulate of rationality (essentially the “Dutch Book”
argument, see Section 4) which gives it a kind of Platonistic perfection. Thus, they
have to rely on the principles of parsimony and simplicity to justify their
adherence to the model, and this is not unreasonable. But for those, among whom
the present authors rank themselves, who are more attracted to empirical criteria
of evaluation such as operationalization than they are to formal virtues, the verdict
is that the mind might well be Bayesian but we will never know whether this is
the case or not.
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Appendix 1
One can put into question the extensively used term of “Bayes’ rule”. The
literature indeed offers several specifications of “Bayes’ rule”. Although these
specifications are equivalent, it appears important to distinguish three major
forms. Given two alternative hypotheses H and ¬H, one event D such that D ≠ ∅,
let P(H) be the prior probability of H, P(H|D) the posterior probability, P(D|H)
and P(D|¬H) the likelihoods and finally P(D) the probability of the data D.
Form 1, “conditional probability”: 
€ 
P(H |D) = P(H∩D)P(D) ,
Form 2, “Bayes’ identity”: 
€ 
P(H |D) = P(H)P(D |H)P(D) ,
Form 3, “Derived Bayes’ identity”:
€ 
O(H |D) = P(H |D)
P(¬H |D)
= P(H)P(D |H)
P(¬H)P(D|¬H)
=O(H) P(D |H)
P(D|¬H)
=O(H)L(D |H).
The vast majority of studies have exclusively used the second form of Bayes’ rule
(b). Few studies have used the third form (c), considering more specifically the
phenomenon of conservatism (for example Phillips and Edwards 1966) or the
base rate neglect (for example Kahneman and Tversky 1973). Pieces of research
quoting the first form of Bayes’ rule (form a) are much less numerous (see
nevertheless Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 1995, Lewis and Keren 1999, Mellers and
McGraw 1999).
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Appendix 2
In the 1960’s, several studies in various fields (computer science, psychology and
medicine) strove to define a rule that would hold in the case where the new
evidence D is not certain (let it be D*). Dodson (1961) addressed this problem. An
uncertain message D* can lead one to elaborate subjective judgment on the
probability of D being true, thus yielding P(D|D*) and its complementary
P(¬D|D*). His idea was to incorporate P(D|D*) and P(¬D|D*) in the conditioning
of H based on the notion of expectation. Dodson suggested that posterior
probability must be equal to the sum of the probabilities conditionally to D and ¬D
multiplied by the probabilities of being in the situation where D is true or where
¬D is true. Dodson (1961) established the following rule:
€ 
P(H | D*) = P(D | D*)P(H | D) +  P(¬D | D*)P(H|¬D) .
One can notice that in the degenerated cases where P(D|D*) = 1 and
P(¬D|D*) = 0, the rule reduces to simple conditioning 
€ 
P(H |D*) = P(H |D)  and
€ 
P(H |D*) = P(H|¬D)  when P(D|D*) = 0 and P(¬D|D*) = 1, respectively. In other
words, Dodson’s rule can be viewed as the generalisation of Bayes’ identity.
Independently, Jeffrey (1965) proposed the same rule of revision. However, in the
subjective interpretation of the Bayesian model as specified in the present paper,
an individual can revise his/her probability directly when learning D*, and it can
be shown that, conversely, Bayes’ identity is equivalent to the Dodson-Jeffrey
rule (under the assumption that D* depends on D but not on H, see for example
Gettys and Wilke 1969, Jaynes 1994, Schaefer and Borcherding 1973, Schum and
du Charme 1971).
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Appendix 3
Gärdenfors (1988) showed that Lewis’ (1976) rule (imaging) can be analysed as a
rule for probabilistic revision. In this case, the methodology of revision is
different from the one provided by Bayes’ rule. We simply intend here to give an
intuitive idea of it (for a detailed technical analysis, see Gärdenfors 1992, Pearl
2000, Walliser and Zwirn 2002). In order to explain this rule, it seems convenient
to use Kripke’s (1962) possible worlds semantics. An agent considers a
distribution of probability on possible worlds. Following a message invalidating a
possible world, degrees of belief concerning this world are redistributed on the
other possible worlds that the agent considers to be the closest to the invalidated
world. Let us consider the following example (Dubois and Prade 1994, Walliser
and Zwirn 2002). A basket may be described by four worlds depending on
whether it contains an apple (a) or not (¬a) together with a banana (b) or not (¬b).
Someone believes at t0 that the basket contains at least one fruit:
K = (a∧b)∨(a∧¬b)∨(¬a∧b). Let us assume that the person’s prior probabilities
associated to each possible world are 1/2 for (a∧b), 1/3 for (¬a∧b), 1/6 for (a∧¬b)
and 0 for (¬a∧¬b). A revising message brought up by a reliable direct witness
informs the person that there is no banana: A = (a∧¬b)∨(¬a∧¬b). The revised
belief K*A is now (a∧¬b), so that the posterior probability allocated to (a∧¬b) is
1. This is what Bayes’ identity gives:
  
€ 
PA (a∧¬b) = P((a∧¬b)|A)
PA (a∧¬b) =
P(a∧¬b)P(A|(a∧¬b))
P(a∧¬b)P(A|(a∧¬b)) + P(a∧ b)P(A|(a∧ b)) + P(¬a∧ b)P(A|(¬a∧ b))
PA (a∧¬b) =
1/3 × 1
1/3 × 1+ 1/2 × 0 + 1/6 × 0 = 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But with Lewis’s rule (or imaging) one will end up with a different result. An
updating message says at t1 that there is no more banana. In this updating
situation, the revised belief K*A is (a∧¬b) ∨ (¬a∧¬b) because the reasoner starts
afresh a distribution over all possible worlds. In order to do so, the prior
probabilities (1/2 and 1/3) attached to (a∧b) and (¬a∧b) are distributed over other
close worlds. One can think that the “world” (a∧b) is closer to (a∧¬b) than to
(¬a∧¬b) (choosing arbitrarily the intuitive physical action as a basis to define the
distance) and therefore the degree of belief 1/2 attached to (a∧b) is attributed to
(a∧¬b):   
€ 
PA(a∧¬b) = 1/6 + 1/2 = 2/3( ) .
Alternatively, one can think that the “ world” (¬a∧b) is closer to (¬a∧¬b)
than to (a∧¬b) and therefore the degree of belief 1/3 attached to (¬a∧b) is
attributed to (¬a∧¬b):
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€ 
PA (¬a∧¬b) = 1/3( ).
This example illustrates the two situations of revision using, of course, a distance
arbitrarily chosen in the updating case. In the latter case (Lewis’ rule), the initial
belief can be thoroughly modified, since one could expect to have no fruit
anymore in the basket following the message.
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Appendix 4
Kolmogorv’s axioms contain the following two “convexity rules” (the impossible
event is noted Ø and the set of possible results Ω):
(i)   
€ 
P(∅) = 0 and P(Ω) = 1;
(ii) H is said to be “significant” if and only if   
€ 
0 < P(H) < 1;
and the additivity rule:
(iii)   
€ 
If H∩G =∅,  then P(H∪G) = P(H) + P(G)
together with its corollary, the complementarity constraint   
€ 
P(H) + P(¬H) = 1.
The conditional probabilities must satisfy the rule of compound
probabilities:
(iv)   
€ 
P(H∩G) = P(H)P(G|H);
and its corollary, namely Bayes’ identity (Appendix 1).
